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Abstract—Over the past few years, there has been 
increasing interest in utilizing Personal Area Networks 
(PANs) to offer users innovative and personalized services. 
This interest is a consequence of the widespread use of 
mobile devices such as laptops, mobile phones, PDAs, 
digital cameras, wireless headsets, etc. to carry out a 
variety of user-centric tasks. The PAN itself is built upon 
an ad-hoc network where devices trust their neighbors to 
route their packets. The cooperative nature of ad-hoc 
networks allows malicious nodes to easily cripple the 
network by inserting false route information, replaying old 
messages, modifying messages of other nodes, etc. An 
applicable area still under research, and the focus of this 
paper, is secure routing protocols for ad-hoc networks. To 
achieve availability in the PAN, the routing protocol used 
must be robust against both dynamically changing 
topology and malicious attacks. However, the 
heterogeneous nature of Personal Network (PN) devices 
means that traditional security mechanisms are too 
resource intensive to be sufficient by themselves. This 
paper describes a new ad-hoc secure routing protocol for 
Personal Networks (PNs), suitable in a limited multi-hop 
scenario. This protocol is based on ADOV and relies on 
efficient cryptographic primitives to safeguard the security 
and privacy of PN users. Following that, a number of 
attacks in the area of ad-hoc networks are discussed, and it 
is shown that the new algorithm protects against multiple 
un-coordinated active attackers, in spite of compromised 
nodes in the network.  
 




Personal Networks (PN) [1] is a new concept related to the 
field of pervasive computing. A PN comprises a core 
consisting of a PAN, and can potentially be extended to 
include all of the person’s devices, both in his vicinity and 
those at remote locations, such as the home and office. This 
on-demand and transparent extension of the PAN, will 
physically be made via infrastructure-based networks such as 
an organizations intranet, other ad-hoc networks, etc. The aim 
of this work is to propose a routing protocol that solves the 
problems of securing multi-hop routing in the core PAN. 
Devices belonging to the PN can have one or more 
wireless interfaces such as Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11, UWB, 
ZigBee, etc. These devices are expected to be mobile and may 
enter or leave the PN at any time. They can also change their 
geographic location while continuing to be part of the PN. 
There are convincing reasons for enabling multi-hop routing 
in the core PAN. For example, in order to ensure network 
connectivity amongst different wireless technologies, nodes 
with more than one type of wireless interface will need to 
route packets between the different radio domains.  
Additionally, due to the limited range of wireless signals, 
multiple hops may be needed for communication. Finally, it 
may be more energy efficient to transmit packets over 
multiple small hops, even if end to end communication is 
possible using one large hop. 
The cooperative nature of ad-hoc networks, in which 
individual nodes cooperate by forwarding packets for each 
other, make PANs highly vulnerable to attack. A security 
mechanism requiring all participating nodes to know a “shared 
secret” (which is regularly updated) can successfully protect 
against attacks from external attackers who are unable to 
“crack” this secret. Such a solution, although quite relevant in 
the context of PNs (where all nodes fall under one 
administrative domain), is ineffective in the presence of 
compromised PN nodes advertising incorrect routing 
information to other PN nodes. Node compromise is a real 
possibility and can occur in different ways, the most common 
of which is likely to be through software viruses, worms, 
trojan software etc.  
One advantage of using a shared key to secure 
communication is that per-link (pair-wise) keys limit passive 
participation and local broadcast. In a PN context, where 
devices can be very heterogeneous in nature, using 
asymmetric cryptography based on public/private keys, 
imposes substantial requirements on the devices, and is 
therefore not realistic. Therefore one challenge of any 
computationally lightweight security mechanism, not based on 
shared secrets, is to implement broadcast authentication using 
only symmetric cryptographic primitives. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Our work, carried out in the context of PNs, addresses the 
issues related to secure communication in a PAN. Security of 
ad-hoc routing protocols can be divided into the two main 
areas of secure routing and secure data forwarding. In this 
paper, we propose a new and efficient secure routing protocol 
for PANs, called SL-AODV (Secure Lightweight AODV).  
The design of SL-AODV is based on the Ad-hoc On-demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) [2] routing protocol, and uses 
efficient symmetric cryptographic primitives. SL-AODV 
prevents external attackers and compromised nodes from 
tampering with routes consisting of uncompromised nodes. It 
also protects against a variety of denial-of-service (DoS) 
attacks.  
A security extension of the AODV routing protocol, 
known as S-AODV (Secure AODV), has been proposed in [3]. 
The S-AODV scheme assumes that each node has certified 
public keys of other network nodes, so that intermediate nodes 
can validate all in-transit routing packets. The originator of a 
routing packet appends to it a signature and the last element of 
a hash chain. As the packet traverses the network, 
intermediate nodes cryptographically validate the signature 
and the hash value, thus validating the integrity of the packet 
and the number of hops to the sender. Unfortunately, the use 
of public key cryptography in S-AODV imposes a high 
processing overhead on intermediate nodes and is unrealistic 
for many PN scenarios. 
SL-AODV being based on the basic operation of the 
AODV protocol, is also a reactive, or an on-demand routing 
protocol. Other well known reactive secure routing protocols 
include ARAN [4], ARIADNE [5] and SRP [6]. Authenticated 
Routing for Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN), like S-AODV, is 
based on asymmetric cryptography and uses authentication 
certificates to protect the routing protocol. Before joining an 
ad-hoc network, a node must authenticate itself using valid 
certificates generated by a certificate authority (CA). 
However, a CA can not always be guaranteed in an ad-hoc 
environment. More importantly, the use of asymmetric 
cryptography imposes a high processing overhead that we 
believe is not realistic for many PN scenarios.  
ARIADNE is a security extension of the DSR protocol 
and uses only efficient symmetric cryptography. The routing 
protocol messages are protected by message authentication 
codes (MACs) and are authenticated at each hop using TESLA 
[8]. TESLA is a broadcast authentication scheme requiring 
loose time synchronization. During route discovery, each hop 
authenticates new information in the route request. The 
destination node buffers the route reply until intermediate 
nodes can release the corresponding TELSA keys. Once the 
TESLA security condition is verified by the destination, it 
includes a MAC in the route reply to certify that the security 
condition was met. TESLA requires the source of the route 
request to estimate a maximum end-to-end delay in the ad-hoc 
network. The choice of this value does not affect the security 
of the protocol, however values that are too small may cause 
the route discovery to fail. Additionally, there must be a 
mechanism to distribute one authentic public TESLA key for 
each node and shared secret keys between pairs of 
communicating nodes. Furthermore, network links must be bi-
directional and there must be loose time synchronization 
between all the nodes. 
The design of the Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) is also 
based on the basic operation of the DSR protocol. The 
strength of SRP lies in the fact that the correctness of 
discovered routes can be verified from the route geometry 
itself. The destination validates the incoming route request 
using a shared key, and constructs a route reply that is 
protected using a MAC. The route reply is then returned to the 
source over the reversed path. False or corrupted routing 
information is discarded by the end nodes using an existing 
end-to-end security association. SRP, like ARIADNE, requires 
network links to be bi-directional and requires existing shared 
secret keys between pairs of communicating nodes. However, 
it does not have the other requirements of ARIADNE, making 
it a good candidate for use in PNs. The main weakness of SRP 
is due to the fact that routing messages are not authenticated in 
intermediate nodes. As a result the protocol is very vulnerable 
to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks such as repeatedly flooding 
the ad-hoc network with route requests. Also, because the 
MAC can not be verified by intermediate nodes, certain DSR 
optimizations can not be applied.  
3. REQUIREMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Most attacks against the routing protocol are caused by 
malicious injection of incorrect routing information, or 
modification of messages from other nodes. To prevent these 
attacks, it is necessary for each intermediate node to verify the 
origin and integrity of routing messages that it forwards.  
Therefore the security requirements for SL-AODV include the 
ability to: perform hop-by-hop authentication of routing 
packets, ensure routing packet integrity and resist replay 
attacks.  
The new security mechanisms provide a defense against 
multiple uncoordinated attackers creating incorrect routes, in 
spite of compromised nodes. SL-AODV requires nodes to 
forward routing protocol packets only of authenticated 
neighboring nodes. Therefore, unauthenticated attackers 
cannot take part in the routing process and are restricted to a 
limited number of types of DoS attacks. SL-AODV is also 
able to withstand node compromise (authenticated nodes 
acting maliciously) by restricting their ability to disrupt the 
routing protocol.    
The authentication mechanism must also have a low 
communication and computation overhead. An inefficient 
authentication mechanism could be exploited by malicious 
nodes by flooding the network with invalid messages and 
overwhelming nodes with the cost of verifying authentication. 
Additionally, to support nodes that have limited processing 
power, the security mechanisms of SL-AODV use efficient 
one-way hash chains [7] and do not use computationally 
expensive asymmetric cryptography. To use a one-way hash 
chain for authentication, we assume a mechanism for nodes to 
distribute commitment of their generated hash chains to all 
other nodes. This is necessary as routing messages generated 
by a node N have to be authenticated by each intermediate 
node that forwards these messages. Therefore, intermediate 
nodes need to know an authentic element from the hash chain 
of node N. 
Lastly, our protocol does not aim to provide 
confidentiality and privacy for the sender of the routing 
message.  
4. SL-AODV 
Each node uses a specific element from its hash chain in each 
route request (RREQ) and route reply (RREP) packet it 
generates. Based on this hash element, the one-way hash chain 
provides authentication for the sequence number and the 
(lower bound value of the) hop count in each routing protocol 
message. In other words, when such a routing protocol 
message is received at a downstream node, that node is able to 
authenticate both the sender of the message and the minimum 
hop count to the sender. This is done using information 
contained in the Hash field of the RREQ and the RREP 
packets. Figures 1 and 2 show the modified packet format of 
the RREQ and the RREP packets. Section 5 will analyze the 
reasons behind these modifications. 
SL-AODV requires an upper bound to be assumed on the 
diameter of the ad-hoc network; we use m-1 to denote this 
bound. Thus, all hop count values in routing packets must be 
less than m. If a node’s hash chain is the sequence of values 
c0, c1, c2, c3 … cn where n is divisible by m, then for a sequence 
number i of some routing packet, let k = n/m - i. An element 
from the group of elements ckm, ckm+1, ckm+2 … ckm+m-1 from the 
hash chain will be used to authenticate the routing packet for 
that sequence number. 
When a node sends a RREQ or a RREP packet, it sets the 
hop count field to 0 and the hash value field to the first 
element in the group of its own hash chain elements 
corresponding to that sequence number. In the above example 
for sequence number i, the node sets the hash value to ckm. 
Nodes receiving any routing packets can easily authenticate 
the hash value, given any earlier authentic hash chain element. 
Based on the sequence number and the hop count of the 
received packet, and the sequence number and the hop count 
of the latest prior authentic hash value for that source, the 
node hashes the hash value received in the packet the correct 
number of times (according to the description above as to 
which hash value must be used for any given sequence 
number and hop count) to confirm that the resulting value 
equals the prior authentic hash value. If so, the entry is 
authentic and the node processes it in the routing algorithm, 
otherwise the node drops the packet. Before this packet is 
retransmitted, the intermediate node will increase the hop 
count by one and update the hash value in the packet to the 
hash of the hash value it originally received (i.e. the first hop 
node will hash ckm to ckm+1 , the second ckm+1 to ckm+2 etc.). 
Additionally, nodes will only accept routing packets with 
sequence numbers higher than what they have on record for 
that source.  
Each time a node generates a routing update, it will use a 
one larger sequence number and use a specific (as explained 
above) next element from its hash chain. The receiving nodes 
will verify that they have not seen a packet from the sender 
with that sequence number or higher, and then verify that the 
hash value corresponds to the sequence number and the hop 
count.  
This use of a hash value corresponding to the sequence 
number and hop count in a routing packet prevents any node 
from advertising a route to some destination claiming a greater 
sequence number than that destination’s own current sequence 
number, due to the one-way nature of the hash chain. 
Likewise, no node can advertise a route better than that for 
which it has received an advertisement, since the hop count in 
an existing route cannot be decreased. Lastly, routing packets 
received at a later time, using the same sequence number are 
automatically dropped, so malicious nodes can not carry out 
replay attacks. 
To safeguard against replay attacks, nodes wishing to 
authenticate a routing packet need to know the latest sequence 
number used by the sender of that packet. Therefore, unlike 
the AODV expanding ring approach for disseminating 
RREQs, SL-AODV requires the RREQs to be disseminated 
through the entire ad-hoc network. This ensures that all the 
nodes are aware of the latest publicly available hash value of 
the sender (corresponding to the latest sequence number used). 
Assuming that network diameter is not large, this should not 
result in perceptible performance degradation. 
For the same reason, the RREPs from the destination also 
need to be disseminated through the entire network, because 
they too contain the latest publicly available hash value of the 
destination. If these RREPs are not widely disseminates, an 
attacker overhearing the RREP can not only replay that packet 
in another part of the network, but also use the hash value to 
construct RREQ packets.  
When a node discloses a new hash chain value (each time 
it generates a RREQ or a RREP packet), all parties potentially 
have access to that value. Since attackers can create bogus 
messages using previously disclosed hash values, receivers 
must verify that the hash value used in each new routing 
message is based on a safe chain element. A safe chain 
element is one that was only known to the sender. Receivers 
must discard any message that is unsafe and may have been 
forged. Therefore, attackers are unable to change their source 
address and are thus much more restricted in their ability to 
disrupt the routing protocol and launch DoS attacks. 
As RREQ packets are broadcasted through the entire ad-
hoc network, they have a major potential for abuse. Nodes 
have, in principle, a limit for the number of RREQ packets 
they are willing to forward for any given node (over a period 
of time). To prevent attackers from changing their source 
address, intermediate nodes authenticate the original sender of 
the RREQ and not merely the last hop sender. Additionally, 
the original sender of the RREP packet is also authenticated, 
to prevent an attacker from advertising invalid routes. 
However, as route error (RERR) packets are only transmitted 
one hop, they are authenticated using security associations 
existing between neighboring nodes, and do not need 
additional protection. A simple check to verify that routes 
listed in RERR packets do indeed go through the sender of the 
RERR packet, will provide sufficiently robust security against 
malicious RERR packets.  
5. SL-AODV PACKET FORMAT 
One of the security requirements for SL-AODV was that the 
source of the RREQ can only trust RREPs that are sent by the 
destination itself. In standard AODV intermediate nodes with 
fresh routes to the destination can also generate RREPs on 
behalf of the destination. Since intermediate nodes are no 
longer trusted to reply to RREQs on behalf of the destination, 
there is no need to have the ‘D’ (Destination only flag) and the 
‘G’ (Gratuitous RREP flag) in the AODV routing packets. 
Details on the AODV packet format can be found in [2]. 
In standard AODV the destination sequence number in a 
RREQ packet has two uses. Firstly, it lets intermediate nodes 
understand how up to date the sender requires the RREP to be. 
Secondly, it helps the destination choose a new sequence 
number when it reboots. After rebooting, a node does not 
remember its sequence number and trusts anybody that sends 
to it a RREQ with the correct number. However, such 
functionality is not acceptable since a malicious node can put 
a much bigger destination sequence number than the real one. 
This allows a very easy attack that consists in setting the 
destination sequence number to the maximum value. The next 
time the node increments the sequence number, its counter 
will overflow and this will cause unexpected results. 
Additionally, the first functionality is also not necessary since 
intermediate nodes are no longer allowed to reply to route 
request packets and the destination is expected to reply with 
the most up to date route.  Therefore, there is no need to have 
a destination sequence number field and the ‘U’ flag in the 
RREQ packet. Lastly, as there is no support for multicasting, 
the ‘J’ and ‘R’ flags are also no longer needed. 
As a result of the expanding ring approach in AODV, 
senders often needed to send multiple RREQs before receiving 
a RREP back. To ensure that sequence numbers are not used 
too fast, each new broadcast increments the RREQ ID value. 
However, since SL-AODV does not use the expanding ring 
approach, senders always increment their sequence number 
before retransmitting RREQs. Intermediate nodes can now use 
the sequence number and source address in each RREQ 
packet, instead of RREQ ID, to drop duplicates. Figure 1 and 
2 show the new SL-AODV RREQ and RREP packet formats 
respectively. 
 
     
 
 
Figure 1: SL-AODV RREQ packet format 
Type: 1 
 
Hop Count: The number of hops from the Originator IP 
Address to the node handling the request. 
 
Destination IP Address: The IP address of the destination for 
which a route is desired. 
 
Originator IP Address: The IP address of the node which 
originated the Route Request. 
 
Originator Sequence Number: The current sequence number 
to be used in the route entry pointing towards the originator of 
the route request. 
 
Hash: Hash value from the senders hash chain corresponding 





Figure 2: SL-AODV RREP packet format 
Type: 2 
 
Destination IP Address: The IP address of the destination for 
which a route is supplied. 
 
Destination Sequence Number: The destination sequence 
number associated to the route. 
 
Originator IP Address: The IP address of the node which 
originated the RREQ for which the route is supplied. 
 
Hash: Hash value from the senders hash chain corresponding 
to the sequence number and hop count of the packet.  
6. EVALUATION 
An obvious disadvantage of fully disseminating routing 
messages is the extra number of transmissions necessary. 
However, this dissemination means that other nodes in the 
network also discover a path to the two communicating nodes. 
It is conceivable that these active nodes may be involved in 
future communication, and in many cases new path discovery 
will not be necessary. As AODV is designed for potentially 
hundreds of nodes, the reverse route made during route 
discovery is deleted if it is not chosen during the route reply. 
This is done in order to reduce the number of entries in local 
routing tables. PANs on the other hand, are made of much 
smaller number of nodes so caching these routes for a longer 
period could be advantageous. Therefore if both the routes in 
the RREQ and the RREQ are cached, all the nodes in the PAN 
will have routes to these communicating nodes. Over time, all 
the active nodes will find themselves in the routing tables of 
other nodes. This is advantageous because node wishing to 
communicate with others may already have route to those 
node. However, if that route is broken, then the standard 
AODV route error packets will be returned and a new route 
discovery can be started. 
However, as certain devices may be very battery/memory 
constrained so frequent broadcasts are not feasible for them. 
These low powered nodes should not take part in routing 
packets belonging to other nodes. Consequently, they also do 
not need to know the hash key commitments of other nodes as 
well (only of those they want to communicate with). 
Malicious nodes can attempt to reduce the amount of 
routing information available to other nodes, by not 
advertising certain routes or by destroying routing packets that 
pass through them. This shows the unwillingness of the 
malicious node to forward packets for those destinations. We 
do not attempt to defend against this attack, since the attacker 
could also otherwise drop data packets sent to those 
destinations. 
Additionally, our protocol does not aim to prevent 
attackers from injecting data packets into the network. 
Injecting data packets only results in a DoS attack if it floods 
the network. However, attackers can attempt to degrade the 
performance of the routing protocol by repeatedly sending 
RREQ packets that flood the network. To thwart malicious 
route request floods, intermediate nodes which authenticate 
each routing message, must filter out excessive route request 
packets coming from one node. 
An attacker can also modify a routing packet by changing 
its destination, source address and the hop count. For example, 
an attacker advertising a zero hop count for all destinations 
can cause all nodes around it to route packets for all the 
destinations to itself. SL-AODV provides defense against this 
type of attack by authenticating the sender of the routing 
packet as well as the number of hops to the sender. 
In another attack, malicious routing packets claiming a 
large sequence number can attempt to force the receiving node 
to perform a large number if hash operation in order to 
authenticate the routing packet. In order to guard against such 
attacks the receiving node should limit the number if hashes it 
is willing to perform for each authentication, discarding 
packets that do not meet that criteria. 
A wormhole attack is carried out by a pair of colluding 
attackers in the network, linked via a tunnel. In such a case, 
every routing packet received by an attacker A, is sent over 
the tunnel to attacker B, to then be forwarded normally by B. 
Similarly, B sends every routing packet it receives to A.  This 
means that the hop count field in these routing packets will not 
be changed, so most routes between nodes towards the two 
ends of the network will pass through A and B, thus creating a 
virtual vertex cut of the nodes in the network. This type of 
attack is very difficult to detect as no false packets are being 
created or maliciously modified, and can not be protected 
against by SL-AODV. 
Lastly, compromised nodes can also be used to launch 
attacks. Since SL-AODV requires nodes to authenticate the 
sender of each routing message, compromised nodes can not 
spoof their source address, and are restricted to attempting 
DoS attacks. SL-AODV protects against such DoS attacks by 
limiting the number of route requests from any one source. So 
neighbors of malicious nodes may temporarily or permanently 
block any further packets from that address. As the source is 
not able to authenticate itself as any other address, it can not 
perform any more attacks.  
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper has presented the design and evaluation of SL-
AODV, a new ad-hoc routing protocol that relies only on 
efficient symmetric cryptography to ensure the security of PN 
users. SL-AODV operates on demand; the design being based 
on the basic operation of AODV. We have made a comparison 
with other existing secure routing protocols like ARIADNE, 
SRP and ARAN and discussed why none of them can insure 
complete security while using simple procedures and 
lightweight mechanisms. Due to the use of hash chains and 
network wide broadcast of routing messages SL-AODV is 
suitable in a limited multi-hop scenario, such as that of a PAN. 
It requires nodes to forward routing protocol packets only of 
authenticated nodes. We have shown that the new protocol 
protects against multiple un-coordinated active attackers, in 
spite of compromised nodes in the network.  
The next step to be done in the evolution of this proposal 
is to implement SL-AODV in the ns-2 simulator and evaluate 
its network performance against standard AODV.  
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The authors gratefully acknowledge that the work presented in 
this paper has been performed in the context of the IOP 
Gencom QoS for PN@home and the ES IST project 
MAGNET. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Ignas G. M. M. Niemegeers, Sonia M. Heemstra de 
Groot, "Research Issues in Ad-Hoc Distributed Personal 
Networking", Wireless Personal Communications: An 
International Journal, Volume 26, Issue 2-3, Pages 149-
167, Kluwer Academic Publishers, August 2003. 
[2] Charles E. Perkins, Elizabeth M. Royer, Samir R. Das, 
“Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing” 
(work in progress), draft-ietf-manet-aodv-13.txt, 
February 2003. 
[3] Manel Guerrero, “Secure ad-hoc on-demand distance 
vector (SAODV) routing”, draft-guerrero-manet-saodv-
01.txt, August 2004. 
[4] C.Shields, B.Dahill, K.Sanzgiri, B.N.Levine and 
E.M.Belding-Royer, “A secure routing protocol for ad-
hoc networks”, in Proceedings of the 10th IEEE 
International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP), 
November 2002. 
[5] Y. Hu, A. Perrig, D. Johnson, “Ariadne: A Secure On-
Demand Routing Protocol for Ad-Hoc Networks”, 
MobiCom ’02, September 23-26, 2002, Atlanta, Georgia, 
USA. 
[6] Z. J. Haas, P.Papadinitratos. “Secure routing for mobile 
ad-hoc networks”, in Proceedings of SCS Communication 
Networks and Distributed Systems Modeling and 
Simulation (CNDS), January 2002. 
[7] Y. Hu, D. Johnson, A. Perrig, “SEAD: secure efficient 
distance vector routing for mobile wireless ad-hoc 
networks”. 
[8] A. Perrig, R. Canetti, D. Song and J.D. Tygar, “Efficient 
and Secure Source Authentication for Multicast, in 
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 
NDSS ’01, pages 35-46, February 2001. 
 
